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The Problem of Communication in

Meeting the Information Requirements

of the Courts
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Layman E. Allen

Professor, Yale Law School

My remarks are addressed to one aspect of the general problem

of communication involved in meeting the information require-

ments of the courts. It transcends merely the court; however, it
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of the Courts

is a problem throughout the legal decision-making system. The

efficiency of courts in processing information is just one part of a

by

larger picture of effective communication within the legal system.

Phrased broadly, the question involves discerning the optimum

man-machine mix in the processing of information. Nobody can
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reasonably quarrel with the goal of taking the fullest possible ad-

vantage of the benefits of emerging technology, as long as objectives

Professor, Yale Law School

of greater importance are not sacrificed in the process.

What can we do to begin to achieve this goal? I would like to

direct your attention for a moment to one crucial spot in the legal

system's information-processing network. This is the untidy, cha-

otic, disorderly organization of the statement of legal norms at the

pinnacle of the legal information-processing system. I refer to the

way that we lawyers draft the statutes that courts must reckon with

in adjudicating disputes. This is an area where substantial bene-

fits may be achieved without any discernible loss. If we really

want to take fullest advantage of the assistance that computers can

provide, greater care in the organization of the expression of legal

norms will be necessary. One might, also, add that improved or-

ganization in the expansion of statutes would facilitate the neces-

sary human handling of statutory materials. Techniques for ac-

complishing this are relatively well known and understood, but the

legal profession is comparatively innocent and unblemished by any

significant contact with them to date. This should be remedied.
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My remarks are addressed to one aspect of the general problem
of communication involved in meeting the information requirements of the courts. It transcends merely the court; however, it
is a problem throughout the legal decision-making system. The
efficiency of t:ourts in processing information is just one part of a
larger picture of effective communication within the legal system.
Phrased broadly, the question involves discerning the optimum
man-machine mix in the processing of information. Nobody can
reasonably quarrel with the goal of taking the fullest possible advantage of the benefits of emerging technology, as long as objectives
of greater importance are not sacrificed in the process.
What can we do to begin to achieve this goal? I would like to
direct your attention for a moment to one crucial spot in the legal
system's information-processing network. This is the untidy, chaotic, disorderly organization of the statement of legal norms at the
pinnacle of the legal information-processing system. I refer to the
way that we lawyers draft the statutes that courts must reckon with
in adjudicating disputes. This is an area where substantial benefits may be achieved without any discernible loss. If we really
want to take fullest advantage of the assistance that computers can
provide, greater care in the organization of the expression of legal
norms will be necessary. One might, also, add that improved organization in the expansion of statutes would facilitate the necessary human handling of statutory materials. Techniques for accomplishing this are relatively well known and understood, but the
legal profession is comparatively innocent and unblemished by any
significant contact with them to date. This should be remedied.
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As statutes are made more orderly, the foundation will be laid for

more orderly and effective storage and retrieval of all of the legal

literature and other written matter associated with those statutes.

Perhaps more significantly, the order introduced will permit the

current burgeoning efforts at document retrieval by computer in

law to blossom into full-fledged information retrieval by machine.

Widespread understanding among statutory draftsmen of what

mathematical logicians call a normal form could revolutionize legal

drafting. The weak link in most current statutes is disorderly syn-

tax. Specifying an appropriate normal form and expressing stat-

utes in such form would help avoid the undue complexity and

ambiguity that is frequently evident through lack of control of

syntax. Standardization in stating an idea is clearly desirable.

There is an extreme lack of uniformity in the syntax of statements

within a single statute, or for that matter, within sections of most

statutes. If choice of language in legal drafting were like choice

of syntax, we would find one sentence of a statute in English, the

next one in German, the next in Chinese, and those that followed

in Spanish, Norwegian, and Hindustani. If the choice of numeral

system by statutory draftsmen were like the choice of syntax, we

might find five denoted by the ordinary arabic numeral 5 in a deci-

mal numeral system in one statutory sentence, by the Roman nu-

meral V in the next, and by the binary expression 101 and the

base-3 expression 12 in subsequent passages. It might take a little

longer to figure out the message if numbers and languages were

selected by statutory draftsmen, but lawyers and judges would man-

age to cope with even such a bizarre practice as this, were it the

custom.

However, we find that it is advantageous to introduce uniformity

by using just one language and just one numeral system to make

communication of ideas more efficient. The same kind of advan-

tage could be achieved by introducing a bit of uniformity into the

syntax of sentences used to express statutory norms. If syntax were

more orderly, the courts would be able to receive help from com-

puters in coping with their information-handling problems. In

addition, orderly syntax may help reduce the magnitude of these

problems by helping to minimize litigation.

Syntax improvement is a variation on the theme of Dr. Duhl's

(Department of Housing and Urban Development) discussion.

This might be entitled "The Possibilities of Minimizing Crime-

Inducing Factors by the Design and Construction of Criminal

Statutes." To the extent that a statute with criminal penalties is
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As statutes are made more orderly. the foundation will be laid for
more orderly and effective storage and retrieval of all of the legal
literature and other written matter associated with those statutes.
Perhaps more significantly, the order introduced will permit the
current burgeoning efforts at document retrieval by computer in
law to blossom into full-Hedged information retrieval by machine.
Widespread understanding among statutory draftsmen of what
mathematical logicians call a normal form could revolutionize legal
drafting. The weak link in most current statutes is disorderly syn·
tax. Specifying an appropriate normal form and expressing stat·
utes in such form ·would help avoid the undue complexity and
ambiguity that is frequently evident through lack of control of
syntax. Standardization in stating an idea is clearly desirable.
There is an extreme lack of uniformity in the syntax of statements
within a single statute, or for that matter, within sections of most
statutes. If choice of language in legal drafting were I ike choice
of syntax, we would find one sentence of a statute in English, the
next one in German, the next in Chinese, and those that followed
in Spanish, Norwegian, and Hindustani. If the choice of numeral
system by statutory draftsmen were like the choice of syntax, we
might find five denoted by the ordinary arabic numeral 5 in a decimal numeral system in one statutory sentence, by the Roman numeral V in the next, and by the binary expression 101 and the
base-3 expression 12 in subsequent passages. It might take a little
longer to figure out the message if numbers and languages were
selected by statutory draftsmen, but lawyers and judges would manage to cope with even such a bizarre practice as this, were it the
custom.
However, we find that it is advantageous to introduce uniformity
by using just one language and just one numeral system to make
communication of ideas more efficient. The same kind of advantage could be achieved by introducing a bit of uniformity into the
syntax of sentences used to express statutory norms. If syntax were
more orderly, the courts would be able to receive help from com·
puters in coping with their information-handling problems. In
addition, orderly syntax may help reduce the magnitude of these
problems by helping to minimize litigation.
Syntax improvement is a variation on the theme of Dr. Duhl's
(Department of Housing and Urban Development) discussion.
This might be entitled "The Possibilities of Minimizing Crime·
Inducing Factors by the Design and Construction of Criminal
Statutes." To the extent that a statute with criminal penalties is
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syntactically ambiguous, there is also some question as to whether

an alleged violator had adequate notice of the kind of behavior

that is intended to be prohibited.

There is an example of this kind of inadvertent syntactic ambi-

guity in the California statute that makes pimping a crime. It

reads:

syntactically ambiguous, there is also some question as to whether
an alleged violator had adequate notice of the kind of behavior
that is intended to be prohibited.
There is an example of this kind of inadvertent syntactic ambiguity in the California statute that makes pimping a crime. It
reads:

Sec. 266h: Any male person who, knowing a female person is

a prostitute . . . solicits or receives compensation for soliciting

for her, is guilty of pimping, a felony, ....

The syntactically ambiguous part of this sentence is solicits or re-

ceives compensation for soliciting for her. Was this passage in-

SEc. 266h: Any male person who, knowing a female person is
a prostitute ... solicits or receives compensation for soliciti11g
for her, is guilty of pimping, a felony, ....

tended to be an abbreviated way of saying merely solicits compen-

sation for soliciting for her or receives compensation for soliciting

for her? The syntactic interpretation will be crucial for the de-

fendant who acknowledges that he solicited for his friend, but

denies that he solicited compensation for soliciting for her. One

might reasonably ask with respect to an example such as this (and

there are many such examples), does it appear to be a situation in

which the ambiguity was deliberately incorporated in the course

of the legislative process? If one answers yes, then one must ask

why the ambiguity was introduced. Revising the drafting process

so that statutes are expressed in normal form would make such

ambiguities so visible that they would most likely be detected and

a deliberate decision made as to the desirability of including them

in the statutory provision. I predict that in most cases the decision

would be to eliminate the ambiguity and to select which of the

various alternatives was deemed most appropriate.

When drafted by the customary methods employed today, such

syntactic ambiguities creep into even the most carefully drawn

documents of high importance. A classic example occurs in the

General Purposes section of the Model Penal Code. It reads:

Section 1.02 Purposes; Principles of Construction.

(1) The general purpose of the provisions governing the

definition of offenses are:

(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and

inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual

and public interests; ....

The passage may seem deceptively clear and simple on first blush,

but when experts are asked what it means, the provision turns out

to be astonishingly ambiguous and complex. Six members of the
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The syntactically ambiguous part of this sentence is solicits or receives compensation for soliciting for her. Was this passage intended to be an abbreviated way of saying merely solicits compensation for soliciting for her or receives compensa.tion for soliciting
for her? The syntactic interpretation will be crucial for the defendant who acknowledges that he solicited for his friend, but
denies that he solicited compensation for soliciting for her. One
might reasonably ask with respect to an example such as this (and
there are many such examples), does it appear to be a situation in
which the ambiguity was deliberately incorporated in the course
of the legislative process? If one answers yes, then one must ask
why the ambiguity was introduced. Revising the drafting process
so that statutes are expressed in normal form would make such
ambiguities so visible that they would most likely be detected and
a deliberate decision made as to the desirability of including them
in the statutory provision. I predict that in most cases the dedsion
would be to eliminate the ambiguity and to select which of the
various alternatives was deemed most appropriate.
When drafted by the customary methods employed today, such
syntactic ambiguities creep into even the most carefully drawn
documents of high importance. A classic example occurs in the
General Purposes section of the Model Penal Code. It reads:
Section 1.02 Purposes; Principles of Construction.
(1) The general purpose of the provisions governing the
definition of offenses are:
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and
inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual
and public interests; ....

The passage may seem deceptively clear and simple on first blush,
but when experts are asked what it means, the provision turns out
to be astonishingly ambiguous and complex. Six members of the
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Yale Law School faculty specializing in criminal law and 6 mem-

bers of the American Law Institute's Criminal Law Advisory Com-

mittee who participated in the formulation of the code responded

to a questionnaire consisting of a series of questions designed to

elicit which syntactic interpretation of this section of the Model

Penal Code the respondents regard as appropriate. From this dis-

tinguished sample of 12 criminal law experts the answers indicated

exactly 12 materially different interpretations regarded as appro-

priate by these interpreters. Not one single pair of this group

interpreted the passage with the same syntax. There is no hint in

the commentary to this section that the draftsmen deliberately in-

tended it to be ambiguous. I would hazard a guess that they

would be surprised to discover that their informed colleagues so

read this passage.

The by-product of organizing statutes so that computers can deal

with them extensively will be that humans will be able to handle

them more effectively. The main benefit to be derived is the

fuller exploitation of computers in the man-machine information-

processing network in the administration of criminal justice.

Now is the time to make the necessary institutional adjustments

necessary to putting statutes into a normal form in order that the

corpus of legal literature will become more and more amenable to

handling by automatic data-processing equipment. Some public

acknowledgment is overdue that we lawyers should not be allowed

to remain so proudly innocent of communications techniques that

are in some instances more than a century old. Some lag is inevi-

table; but how much lag is reasonable? In this respect, we could

use some help in becoming civilized. I will conclude by remind-

ing you that a great judge once said that reform in the law is not

a job for the shortwinded. As you undertake the task of enlighten-

ing us, you may find some comfort in remembering his wisdom.

112

Yale Law School faculty specializing in criminal Jaw and 6 members of the American Law Institute's Criminal Law Advisory Committee who participated in the formulation of the code responded
to a questionnaire consisting of a series of questions designed to
elicit which syntactic interpretation of this section of the Model
Penal Code the respondents regard as appropriate. From this distinguished sample of 12 criminal law experts the answers indicated
exactly 12 materially different interpretations regarded as appropriate by these interpretors. Not one single pair of this group
interpreted the passage with the same syntax. There is no hint in
the commentary to this section that the draftsmen deliberately intended it to be ambiguous. I would hazard a guess that they
would be surprised to discover that their informed colleagues so
read this passage.
The by-product of organizing statutes so that computers can deal
with them extensively will be that humans will be able to handle
them more effectively. The main benefit to be derived is the
fuller exploitation of computers in the man-machine information·
processing network in the administration of criminal justice.
Now is the time to make the necessary institutional adjustments
necessary to putting statutes into a normal form in order that the
corpus of legal literature will become more and more amenable to
handling by automatic data-processing equipment. Some public
acknowledgment is overdue that we lawyers should not be allowed
to remain so proudly innocent of communications techniques that
are in some instances more than a century old. Some lag is inevitable; but how much lag is reasonable? In this respect, we could
use some help in becoming civilized. I will conclude by reminding you that a great judge once said that reform in the law is not
a job for the shortwinded. As you undertake the task of enlighten·
ing us, you may find some comfort in remembering his wisdom.
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